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A leading issue in international corporate compliance is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA) and related anti-corruption legislation in various countries. Based on press reports of
celebrated cases and compliance investigations, most of the attention devoted to FCPA compliance on
the part of corporate counsel, compliance officers, enforcement authorities and legal scholars and
commentators has been directed to the compliance challenges presented by contracting with foreign
government agencies and departments, and with state-owned enterprises. Relatively little attention
has been devoted to the FCPA compliance challenges presented by import and export operations.
Especially in emerging markets with relatively high levels of official corruption, such import and
export operations present a 'perfect storm" of FCPA compliance risk, involving the confluence of
(i) interactions with government officials (often poorly compensated); (ii) dependence upon third
parties (customs brokers, freight forwarders, consultants and import/export agents) who may sub-
scribe to very different (and lax) business ethical principles and standards; (iii) relatively high rates
of customs duties and import and export taxes; and (iv) a lack of transparency in international
trade laws, regulations and procedural requirements. This article, therefore, identifies the key
FCPA compliance issues and challenges arising in connection with import and export operations,
and presents a series of warnings and recommendations to mitigate the compliance risks associated
with those operations.
I. Introduction
In the thirty-five years since the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), there has been a great deal of commentary, both in the legal journals and in the
popular press, about the application and interpretation of that statute. Moreover, in the
past decade, FCPA enforcement has been a matter of high priority for the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Those enforcement
efforts have resulted in judgments obtained and settlement agreements reached in which
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prominent companies have been subject to very large fines and penalties.' Generally, the
most prominent (or notorious) FCPA enforcement actions have involved large payments
to foreign officials in order to secure large contracts from foreign government agencies for
the purchase of goods and services.
In response to increased attention and law enforcement efforts devoted to FCPA com-
pliance, a great many business enterprises have dedicated substantial resources to FCPA
compliance policies, procedures, and training. In large part, those compliance efforts have
been designed to prevent improper payments in connection with soliciting, promoting,
obtaining, and maintaining contracts and other business opportunities with foreign gov-
ernment agencies. In contrast, it appears that relatively little attention on the part of
corporate compliance officials has been devoted to FCPA compliance issues in connection
with corporate import and export operations. The relative lack of attention to FCPA
compliance is unfortunate and fraught with peril because, as discussed in this paper, im-
port and export operations-especially in emerging markets-pose significant risks to
U.S. companies under the FCPA.
The import of merchandise into and the export of merchandise from any particular
country invariably involve substantial interactions with government officials of that coun-
try (e.g., customs officials, import/export licensing officials, product safety certification
and standards officials, etc.). In many emerging markets, imported merchandise is subject
to relatively high import duties and taxes that adversely affect the competitiveness of that
merchandise in those countries. Correspondingly, many emerging markets also have im-
port and export licensing and other regulatory requirements that lack transparency and
that may make the movement of merchandise into and out of those countries time-con-
suming, cumbersome, and expensive. Under these circumstances, especially in "high-risk"
countries where local officials may be significantly underpaid and where official corrup-
tion is commonplace, the temptation to make payments or provide other benefits to those
local officials in order to "facilitate" or "expedite" the import and export of merchandise
may be very high. Such payments to foreign customs, tax, and import/export regulatory
officials are, however, likely to run afoul of the FCPA.
In view of the FCPA compliance risks posed by import and export operations, corporate
trade compliance officials need to be aware of requirements and restrictions of the FCPA,
and the application of that statute to the various circumstances in which compliance
problems may arise. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to highlight those situations
in which the import and/or export of merchandise in international trade and commerce
may cause FCPA compliance problems or may expose corporate importers and exporters
to potential liability for violations of the FCPA. Although this paper is directed primarily
at corporate trade compliance officials, it is extremely important that corporate counsel
and corporate ethics and compliance officers understand this often-overlooked area of
FCPA compliance exposure. As trade compliance professionals are generally the corpo-
rate officials with the greatest visibility into import and export operations, including the
1. The largest penalties to date were imposed upon Siemens AG and its affiliates. In December, 2008,
Siemens paid fines in the total amount of $1.6 billion to the DOJ, the SEC, and German authorities in
connection with guilty pleas to multiple violations of the FCPA. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to
Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at httpI/www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2008/December/08-crm-l 105.html.
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activities of third parties acting on behalf of the company (e.g., customs brokers, freight
forwarders, logistics service providers, and trade consultants), those trade compliance pro-
fessionals can and should be key players in the company's overall efforts to assure compli-
ance with its obligations under the FCPA.2
H. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 to prevent bribery of foreign officials by U.S. compa-
nies.3 There are two separate and distinct provisions of the FCPA, as follows: (i) the anti-
bribery provisions, which prohibit payments to foreign officials for certain specified im-
proper purposes; and (ii) the accounting provisions, which require publicly-traded compa-
nies to keep accurate books and records of account and to establish and maintain effective
internal accounting controls. As discussed below, each of these separate provisions of the
FCPA has significant implications for business practices in import/export operations.4
A. THE ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS OF THE FCPA
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are set forth in two separate sections of the
statute: section 103,s which applies to "issuers," 6 and section 104,7 which applies to "do-
mestic concerns."8 Those anti-bribery provisions9 prohibit any issuer and domestic con-
cern and any officer, director, employee or agent, acting on behalf of an issuer or a
domestic concern from paying or giving, or promising or offering to pay or give, or au-
thorizing another person to pay or give, any money or any other thing of value to a "for-
eign official" for the purpose of(i) influencing any act or decision by that foreign official; (ii)
inducing that foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his/her lawful
duty; (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (iv) inducing the foreign official to use his/
her influence to assist the payor in obtaining or retaining business, or directing business to
2. Two absolutely essential resources for any FCPA compliance program are (i) DEP'T OF JUSTICE & SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [here-
inafter DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE] and (ii) ROBERT W. TARuN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES AcT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL
LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Tarun].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd, 78ff.
4. Id.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
6. An "issuer" is a company (i) whose shares are registered with the SEC under section 12 of the FCPA or
(ii) a company that is required to file reports with the SEC under section 15(d) of the FCPA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 781; 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
8. The term "domestic concern" is defined in section 104(h) of the FCPA, as amended, to include (1) any
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States or (2) any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which
has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of any State or
territory of the United States. The intent of broadly defining the term "domestic concern" is to assure that
all corporations and other business enterprises that are not "issuers" under the Securities Exchange Act are
nonetheless covered by the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
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another person.10 For purposes of this paper, there are five elements of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA that merit special consideration.
1. Foreign Officials
The FCPA prohibits certain improper payments to "foreign officials." The term "for-
eign official" is defined in Sections 103(f(1)(A) and 104(h)(2)(A) as:
[Any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, or any public international organization, or any person act-
ing in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department,
agency or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international
organization.II
Officials and employees of a country's customs service, import/export licensing agency,
or other regulatory agency clearly come within the scope of the statutory definition of a
"foreign official."12 Importantly, officers and employees of private parties acting on behalf
of a foreign government department or agency may also be "foreign officials" for purposes
of the FCPA.13 This point may be of considerable importance for import/export opera-
tions because the various regulatory agencies and/or the customs service in a number of
countries have engaged private companies, such as SGS, to conduct tests or pre-shipment
inspections of merchandise to be imported into those countries, in order to assure that the
merchandise conforms to the country's product safety, environmental, and certification
standards. A payment made to an employee of such a private inspection company (e.g., to
issue a false inspection report or to certify non-conforming goods) could constitute a vio-
lation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, just as would a payment made to a
foreign government customs inspector or regulatory enforcement officer under the stan-
dards discussed below.
2. Business Purpose
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit payments to any foreign official for the
purpose of: (i) causing that foreign official to fail to perform his/her lawful duty, (ii) se-
curing an improper advantage, or (iii) inducing the foreign official to use his/her influence
to obtain or retain business for the payor or to direct business to any other person.' 4
Based on the statutory language of this "business purpose" element of the FCPA, the
principal focus of FCPA compliance and enforcement activities has been in preventing or
punishing the payment by U.S. companies of bribes to foreign officials made to obtain
procurement contracts and other business opportunities from foreign governments.
10. Violators of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are, in the case of corporations, subject to criminal
fines of up to $2 million per violation and, in the case of individuals, subject to fines of up to $100,000 and up
to five years imprisonment. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(c)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
12. See, e.g., Information, 1 19 United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. H-07-CR-004 (S.D. Tex.)
2007.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(l)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
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Nonetheless, the 2004 decision of the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Kay makes it clear that the "business purpose" element of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA extends beyond payments made to foreign officials to obtain gov-
ernment contracts. 15 In the Kay case, the defendants were indicted under the FCPA for
paying bribes to Haitian customs officials in order to avoid paying lawful duties and im-
port taxes on the importation of rice into Haiti.16 The defendants challenged their indict-
ments on the ground that payments made to foreign officials to avoid (or evade) the
payment of duties and taxes were not within the scope of the prohibitions of the FCPA
because they were not made "to obtain or retain business."17 The Court of Appeals, how-
ever, rejected that argument and held that:
Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the
payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and
that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability
constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage.'s
It is now well established (and should be assumed for purposes of designing and imple-
menting compliance programs) that a payment made to a foreign customs officer or in-
spector for the purpose of avoiding the payment of lawful duties and taxes, or for the
purpose of avoiding compliance with other regulatory requirements and formalities, in
connection with the importation of merchandise into a particular country, will constitute a
payment made for an improper business purpose as contemplated by the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions.' 9
3. Payments to Third Parties
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit payments for improper purposes made
both directly to foreign officials and through third party intermediaries. 20 Thus, sections
103(a)(3) and 104(a)(3) prohibit issuers and domestic concerns, respectively, from paying,
giving, or offering or promising to pay or give any money or any other thing of value to
any person with knowledge that all or a portion of that money or other thing of value will
15. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cit. 2004), convictions affirmed, 513 F.3d 432 (5th Cit. 2007),
rehearing denied, 513 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2008).
16. Id. at 740-41.
17. Id.
18. Kay, 359 F.3d at 755; see also H.R. CONFERENCE REP. No. 100-576, pt. 1, at 918 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)
(discussing the "business purpose" element of the FCPA in connection with the 1988 amendments to the
statute. The "business purpose" element of the statute is "not limited to the renewal of contracts or other
business, but also includes a prohibition against corrupt payments related to the execution or performance of
contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as a payment to aforeign official for the purpose ofobtaining
more favorable tax treatment." [emphasis in the original].
19. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Panalpina, No. 10-CR-765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010) (pay-
ments made to Nigerian Customs Service employees to avoid Nigerian customs duties and taxes); Informa-
tion, Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., supra note 12 (payments made to Nigerian Customs Service employees to secure
preferential treatment in connection with customs clearance process and the avoidance of Nigerian customs
duties and tariffs); Helmerich & Payne, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 60400, 2009 WL 2341649 (uly 30,
2009), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60400.pdf (payments made to Argentine and Vene-
zuelan customs officials (1) to import merchandise without proper certifications, (2) to secure a lower duty
rate that lawfully applicable, and (3) to import and export merchandise contrary to import/export
regulations).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; 15 U.S.C. § dd-2.
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be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official for an improper
purpose. 21 This element of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions presents particular com-
pliance challenges in the context of import/export operations, because companies typically
rely upon third parties to perform essential services in connection with international trade
transactions. Thus, export clearance and international shipment of merchandise is typi-
cally handled for exporters by independent freight forwarders or logistics service provid-
ers. Under many countries' customs laws and regulations, import and customs clearance
formalities must be handled by licensed customs brokers or authorized import/export cor-
porations; and, in those countries with complex import regulations and non-tariff barriers
lacking in transparency, as a practical matter it may be necessary to engage a local trade
consultant to handle compliance with regulatory requirements and import restrictions.
Under the foregoing sections of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, a U.S. com-
pany may be subject to "imputed liability" under the FCPA in the event that a customs
broker, freight forwarder, or other third party service provider makes an improper pay-
ment to a foreign customs or import/export regulatory official on behalf of that U.S.
company. 22
An issuer or a domestic concern may be subject to imputed liability under the FCPA,
based on an improper payment made to a foreign official by a third party intermediary, if
that issuer or domestic concern makes a payment or provides some other thing of value to
the third party intermediary with knowledge that some or all of the payment or other
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised to that foreign official. 23 For purposes of
imposing such "imputed liability" on an issuer or a domestic concern, however, it is not
necessary for the DOJ or SEC to prove that the issuer or domestic concern had actual
knowledge that the third party intended to, and did, make the payment to a foreign official.
Instead, under sections 103(0(2) and 104(h)(3) of the statute, a person will be deemed to
have knowledge of an improper payment by a third party intermediary if that person is
aware of facts and circumstances indicating a high probability that the improper payment
is likely to occur.24
In effect, an issuer or domestic concern may be subject to penalties, including criminal
penalties, under the FCPA if the evidence shows a "conscious disregard" or "willful blind-
ness" on the part of the issuer or domestic concern to the activities of a third party inter-
mediary acting on its behalf in dealing with foreign officials. 25 Evidence of such a
conscious disregard or willful blindness may take the form of various red flags suggesting a
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78-dd-2(a)(3).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Com-
pany Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156 Million in Criminal
Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html; In-
formation, United States v. Pride Int'l, Inc., No. 10-CR-766 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010); Information, United
States v. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Co. Ltd., No. 10-CR-767 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010);
Information, United States v. Tidewater Marine Int'l, Inc., No. 10-CR-770 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010); Infor-
mation, United States v. Transocean, Inc., No. 10-CR-765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010); Compl., SEC v. Noble
Corp., No. 10-CV-4336 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010).
24. DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra, note 2, at 22.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 919-21 (Legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the FCPA). One
of the key objectives of the 1988 amendments to the statute was to clarify the knowledge standard for im-
puted liability based on improper payments by third parties.
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heightened possibility that a third party intermediary may intend, or may have an incen-
tive to, make improper payments to foreign officials in furtherance of the issuer's or do-
mestic concern's business. As discussed in detail in Sections 1(A) and 11(B) of this paper,
infra, an effective FCPA compliance program should, therefore, include: (i) comprehen-
sive due diligence in engaging third party intermediaries-including freight forwarders,
customs brokers, logistics service providers, and trade consultants-to determine if the
intermediary or the proposed relationship presents any such red flags and (ii) carefully
monitoring the activities of the third party intermediaries to assure that the in-
termediaries' on-going performance does not indicate the presence of any such red flags.26
4. The Facilitating Payment Exception: Trap for the Unwary
Sections 103(b) and 104(b) of the FCPA include an exception to the anti-bribery
prohibitions for facilitating or expediting payments made to foreign officials to expedite or
secure the performance of a "routine governmental action." 27 For purposes of this "facili-
tating payment" exception, "routine governmental action" is defined to mean, and is lim-
ited to, actions ordinarily and commonly performed by foreign officials (ministerial or
clerical officials) in connection with:
(i) Obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify to do business
in a foreign country;
(ii) Processing governmental papers, such as visas or work orders;
(iii) Providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections
associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across
country;
(iv) Providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
(v) Actions of a similar nature.28
Especially in the context of import/export operations, it is submitted that this "facilitat-
ing payment" exception is a trap for the unwary and any issuer or domestic concern would
be extremely ill-advised to rely upon the exception as a basis for ignoring or justifying
payments made to foreign customs or other import/export regulatory officials in connec-
tion with the import or export of merchandise into or out of a foreign country. Thus, for
26. For a comprehensive list of "red flags" that may arise with respect to relationships with third party
intermediaries, including agents and consultants, see Tarun, supra note 2, at 91-92.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b). This "facilitating payment" represents a codification, as
part of the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, of Congress' intent when the FCPA was first enacted in 1977.
Thus, the legislative history of the 1977 version of the FCPA reflects Congress' intent to exclude "facilitating
payments" from the anti-bribery prohibitions of the statute, as follows: "The language of the bill is deliber-
ately cast in terms which differentiate between such payments and facilitating payments, sometimes called
'grease payments.' In using the word 'corruptly,' the committee intends to distinguish between payments
which cause an official to exercise other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or
decision and those payments which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or
which do not involve any discretionary action. ... For example, a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed
the processing of a customs document would not be reached by the bill. Nor would it reach payments made
to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or
clerical nature which must of necessity be performed in any event." H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977)
(Conf. Rep.).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(0(3)(A), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
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example, payments made to foreign customs officers will almost invariably be character-
ized by the payor as made solely to "facilitate" or "expedite" the importation of merchan-
dise into the foreign country in question. 29
The fact that a payment to a foreign official is characterized (or identified on a customs
broker's or import/export agent's invoice) as made to facilitate or expedite the customs
clearance and regulatory formalities for the importation of merchandise does not, how-
ever, make that payment permissible under the "facilitating payment" exception to the
FCPA. To the contrary, if the payment to a foreign official is intended to avoid (i) the
payment of lawful customs duties and import taxes; (ii) compliance with customs inspec-
tion or product certification requirements; or (iii) compliance with other import/export
regulatory formalities, the payment will be an illegal bribe under the FCPA, even if the
intent and effect of the payment is to "facilitate" or expedite" the importation of merchan-
dise into the foreign official's country.30 As discussed in detail in Section II(A) of this
paper, infra, the characterization of a payment on an employee's expense report or on an
invoice submitted by a customs broker, freight forwarder, or import/export agent as a
payment to facilitate or expedite the import or export of merchandise should, in fact, be
seen as a red flag suggesting the possibility that an improper payment has been made to a
foreign official in connection with the movement of that merchandise.
5. De Minimis Payments to Foreign Officials
It is important to emphasize that there is no exception to the anti-bribery prohibitions
of the FCPA for de minimis payments to foreign officials. A payment made by or on behalf
of an issuer or domestic concern to a foreign official, even if trivial in amount, may still
constitute an illegal bribe under the FCPA if made for an improper purpose (i.e., to obtain
or retain business or to secure some other improper advantage). Thus, for example, in the
SEC's administrative enforcement action against Helmerich & Payne, Inc. (H&P), it was
alleged that H&P made payments to Venezuelan customs officials in the total amount of
only $7,000 over a five-year period. Nonetheless, those payments were treated as unlawful
bribes, as they were made to avoid customs inspections and compliance with Venezuelan
import/export regulation.3i
29. For example, in In the matter of Helmerich & Payne, Inc., the SEC charged that H&P made improper
payments to Argentine and Venezuelan customs officials to (i) avoid customs duties, (ii) import merchandise
without required customs inspections, and (iii) import merchandise that was not authorized for importation
under local law. H&P had characterized the payments as "customs processing" or "customs facilitation"
payments. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., supra note 19. Similarly, the Plea Agreement in United States v. Panalpina,
indicates that improper payments made by Panalpina on behalf of its customers to Nigerian Customs Service
employees were invoiced to the customers as "local processing fees" or "administration/transport charges."
Panalpina, No. 10-CR-765.
30. DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 25. A further problem with the "facilitating
payment" exception to the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions is that even if a payment to a foreign official does,
in fact, come within the scope of that exception and therefore does not constitute a violation of the FCPA, it
is likely to be an unlawful payment under the laws of the foreign official's home country. Anti-corruption and
public service laws of most countries generally prohibit government officials from receiving, and private par-
ties from offering, consideration of any kind for the performance by those government officials of their
official duties.
31. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2009 WL 2341649, Statement of Facts, I 11. In connection with the 1988
amendments to the FCPA Congress considered adding an affirmative defense for nominal payments and gifts
to foreign officials, given as a courtesy or token of respect, of reasonable value consistent with local customs
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B. THE ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS OF THE FCPA
Section 102 of the FCPA32 imposes two separate obligations on issuers, which are in-
tended to supplement the anti-bribery provisions of the statute, by preventing "off books"
accounts and other accounting irregularities that may be intended to disguise improper
payments to foreign officials33 Specifically, those "accounting provisions" of the FCPA
require each issuer to:
(A) Make and keep books, records and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accu-
rately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of assets of the issuer34: [and]
(B) Devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to pro-
vide reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions are executed in accordance with man-
agement's. . . authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to [ ] permit
the preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles. . . and [I to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to
assets is permitted only in accordance with management's. . . authorization; and (iv)
the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasona-
ble intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences. . .35
There are three key points regarding the accounting provisions of the FCPA that may
be particularly relevant to understanding the application of those provisions to import/
export operations of a multinational corporation. First, unlike the anti-bribery provisions
of the statute, the accounting principles apply directly to those foreign subsidiaries of an
issuer whose assets, operations, and financial results are included in the consolidated fi-
nancial statements of the issuer. Thus, an improper payment to a foreign official made by
a foreign subsidiary of an issuer and mischaracterized on the books and records of that
foreign subsidiary may constitute a violation by the issuer of both the books and records
provision and the internal accounting controls provision of the FCPA, even if there is no
other jurisdictional nexus between the improper payment and the United States (i.e., the
improper payment may not be within the jurisdictional scope of the anti-bribery provi-
sions of the statute).36 This point may be especially important for issuers whose foreign
subsidiaries act as importers and exporters of record in their respective countries.
and business practices. That proposed amendment was, however, deleted from the final version of the 1988
amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
32. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b). The legislative history of the
FCPA's accounting provisions explains the importance of those provisions in preventing the payment of
bribes to foreign officials as follows: "corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification of corporate
books and records . . M he accounting provisions remove this avenue of cover-up ... (Tlaken together, the
accounting provisions and the criminal anti-bribery provisions should effectively deter corporate bribery of
foreign government officials." S. REP. No. 95-114, at 2 (1977).
33. Violations of the accounting provisions of the FCPA are punishable, in the case of issuers, by criminal
fines of up to $25 million and, in the case of individuals, by criminal fines of up to $5 million and imprison-
ment for up to 20 years. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c).
34. The mandate of the "books and records" provision of the FCPA is implemented by SEC Rule 13b2-1,
which provides that "No person shall directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to by falsified, any book, record or
account subject to section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B).
36. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., Litigation Release No. 16839 available at http://www.sec.gov/litiga
tion/litreleases/lrl6839.htm (Dec. 21, 2000) (announcing the settlement of a civil action against IBM under
the books and records provision of the FCPA for payments made by IBM's Argentine subsidiary to officials of
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Second, although the accounting provisions were enacted as part of the FCPA and were
intended primarily to prohibit the concealment of improper payments to foreign officials
through "off books" accounts and falsified accounting records, the application of those
accounting provisions is not so limited. To the contrary, the making of a false accounting
record or the mischaracterization of a particular payment on the books and records of an
issuer may constitute a violation of the accounting provisions of the FCPA, even where (i)
the actual payment is lawful under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA or (ii) there is
no evidence whatsoever that the false accounting record involved a payment to a foreign
official.37 Accordingly, as discussed in more detail in Section II(B) of this paper, infra, the
issuance of a commercial invoice, to be used in connection with the import of merchandise
into a foreign country in which the value of the merchandise is misstated and/or other
false or inaccurate information about the merchandise is presented, may constitute a viola-
tion of the books and records provisions of the FCPA.38 A commercial invoice reflecting
the sale of merchandise by an issuer to a foreign buyer is an "accounting record" for
purposes of that books and records provision.
Third, there is no "materiality" element under the FCPA's accounting provisions. A
violation of those accounting provisions may occur if an issuer (or a person acting on
behalf of the issuer) knowingly makes a false accounting document (such as an invoice) or
makes a false entry on the issuer's books and records of account, even if the inaccurate
amount is relatively small.3 9 In many instances, the values of individual import or export
transactions and individual customs entries are likely to be well below the company's "ma-
teriality" threshold for SEC financial reporting purposes.
III. Import/Export Problem Areas for FCPA Compliance
The following are among the circumstances in which FCPA compliance risks and
problems are most likely to be encountered in connection with import/export operations:
A. AVOIDANCE OF CUSTOMs DUTIES AND IMPORT TAXEs
The import and customs laws and regulations in a number of emerging countries im-
pose high customs duties and import taxes on imported merchandise, which has a severely
negative impact on the competitiveness of imported merchandise as compared to similar
goods produced locally (but which may be of lesser quality and/or technical sophistica-
an Argentine state-owned commercial bank that were improperly recorded on the IBM Argentina books and
records of account. IBM Argentina's management overrode IBM's procurement and contracting procedures
and sought to disguise those actions by mischaracterizing the payments in question as subcontracting fees).
37. See DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 38 ("Although the accounting provisions were
originally enacted as part of the FCPA, they do not apply only to bribery-related violations"); see also Helmer-
ich dr Payne, Inc., 2009 WL 2341649, Statement of Facts, 9 9-10 (alleging that H&P made payments to
Argentine and Venezuelan customs officials to facilitate the performance of routine governmental actions, but
improperly recorded those payments on the company's books and records in order to conceal the true nature
and purpose of the payments).
38. See, e.g., DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 41.
39. See, e.g., SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
VOL. 47, NO. 1
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 53
tion). 40 As a result, in a highly competitive environment there may be a temptation to find
ways to avoid or minimize those customs duties and import taxes. As the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the United States v. Kay case shows, a payment made to a foreign
customs officer for the purpose of avoiding (or evading) lawful customs duties and import
taxes will constitute an unlawful bribe under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.4 1 In
the United States v. Kay case, the defendants paid bribes to Haitian customs officials to
induce those officials to accept false customs entry documents on which the quantity of
imported merchandise and the value of that merchandise were understated, so as to mini-
mize Haitian customs duties and import taxes.42
For companies that have adhered to strict standards of business ethics and have imple-
mented robust internal FCPA compliance policies and programs, the greatest FCPA com-
pliance risk in the importation of merchandise into such emerging markets may arise in
connection with dealings with and through third party intermediaries, such as customs
brokers, import/export agents, and trade consultants. That risk may be highlighted by the
facts and circumstances surrounding the United States v. Panalpina case. Panalpina is an
international logistics services company that provides freight forwarding and customs
clearance services on behalf of its clients.43 In the Plea Agreement resolving that case,
Panalpina admitted paying bribes to Nigerian customs officials to secure preferential cus-
toms treatment, including the avoidance of taxes and duties, for merchandise imported
into Nigeria on behalf of Panalpina's customers. 44 Concurrently with the resolution of
the Panalpina case, five of Panalpina's customers also agreed to the payment of substantial
fines and penalties to resolve FCPA violations. Those five customers acknowledged that
they knew that Panalpina had made the improper payments to Nigerian customs
officials. 45
A customs broker or other intermediary may make payments to a foreign customs offi-
cial to avoid or reduce customs duties and import taxes in order to "assist" its customer
(i.e., the U.S. issuer or domestic concern) in enhancing its competitive position in the
country of importation.46 In such circumstances, the improper payments may be made by
40. For example, the effect of the imposition of customs duties, federal excise taxes, state value added taxes,
and various municipal taxes and fees on merchandise imported into Brazil may be that the "landed" cost of
that merchandise is approximately twice the FOB, port of shipment, sales price of that merchandise.
41. See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004); see also H.R. CONFERENCE REP. No. 100-
576, at 918-919 (explaining that the FCPA's prohibition against corrupt payments includes payments to for-
eign officials for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment).
42. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d at 740-41.
43. Panalpina, No. 10-CR-765, at Attachment B, B-2, T 1.
44. Id. at B-2, 1 2-4.
45. See 15 U.S.C. sec. 78dd-l(a)(3), 78-dd-2(a)(3); see also Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., supra note 12, 30-31
(discussing a situation where a customs broker made improper payments to Nigerian Customs Service offi-
cials in order to secure preferential treatment for merchandise imported into Nigeria for and on behalf of
Vetco Gray, with knowledge and authorization by Vetco Gray of those improper payments).
46. In one instance with which the author is familiar, the effort by a foreign contract manufacturer located
in a Southeast Asian country to reduce the cost of products that the contractor manufactured for a U.S.
company exposed the company to a serious FCPA compliance risk. The parts and components used in the
manufacturing process were subject to high customs duties upon importation into the Southeast Asian coun-
try in question, and the contractor was not able to recover those customs duties upon exportation of the
finished goods to the U.S. company (i.e., no duty drawback or inward processing duty refund was available).
The contractor, therefore, made payments without the actual knowledge of the U.S. company to local cus-
toms officers to cause those customs officers to "reclassify" the parts and components under a different tariff
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the customs broker or other intermediary to those foreign officials without the direct
authorization or actual knowledge of the issuer or domestic concern. Nonetheless, as
explained in Section II(A)(3) of this paper, supra, "knowledge" of such improper payments
may be inferred (for purposes of imposing "imputed liability" under the FCPA on the
issuer or domestic concern) from the presence of "red flags" suggesting willful blindness
or conscious disregard of FCPA compliance risks. Accordingly, in dealing with customs
brokers and other third party intermediaries assisting with import/export operations, es-
pecially in "high risk" countries,47 international trade professionals working for U.S. com-
panies should be on the lookout for the following: (i) arrangements that may suggest that
merchandise is not being imported into those countries in strict compliance with local
customs and import laws and regulations or (ii) unusual costs and expense charges that
may be disguised requests for reimbursement for improper payments made to foreign
customs officials. Examples of such "red flags" suggesting the possibility of improper pay-
ments to foreign customs officials include
* customs entry documents classifying the goods in question under an unusual or de-
monstrably incorrect tariff classification number;
* customs entry documents declaring the customs value of the goods at a substantially
lower amount than the sales price stated on the U.S. supplier's commercial invoice
for those goods;
* requests for payment or reimbursement of "customs processing fees," "customs expe-
diting fees," "administrative fees," and "special handling charges;"48 and
* unusual shipping and routing arrangements.
To that end, any agreement with a third party intermediary that will handle any import/
export operations on behalf of a U.S. company should include audit rights that authorize
the U.S. company to conduct an audit of the third party intermediary's books and records
to confirm the third party intermediary's compliance with its obligations under that agree-
ment, especially FCPA compliance provisions. The U.S. company should then invoke
those audit provisions in the event that any such "red flags" suggesting the possibility of an
improper payment by the third party intermediary to a foreign customs (or other) official
come to the attention of the U.S. company's international trade professionals.49
classification number, which was subject to a much lower rate of customs duty. The U.S. company only
learned of the improper payments by the contractor when that contractor sought reimbursement for "tea
money" that it had paid to the local customs officers to secure that favorable customs treatment for the
imported parts and components.
47. Transparency International, a non-governmental organization based in Berlin, Germany, publishes an
annual corruption perception index (CPI), ranking 176 countries in terms of the perception of the level of
official corruption. Any country with a CPI score of 5.0 or less is considered a "high risk" country from an
FCPA compliance perspective. The Transparency International CPI may be found at http://www.transparen
cy.org/cpi2012. For a discussion of how the DOJ and the SEC refer to the Transparency International CPI
in evaluating corporate compliance efforts under the FCPA, see Tarun, supra note 2, at 92-93.
48. The improper payments by Panalpina on behalf of its customers were so characterized when charged
back to those customers. See Panalpina, No. 10-CR-765, 1 68 (specifying that recording payments to a cus-
toms broker as "customs processing fees," "special handling fees," or "facilitating or expediting fees," where
an issuer knows that the payments are, in fact, reimbursements for improper payments to foreign customs
officials, will also constitute a violation of the FCPA's books, records, and internal accounting controls re-
quirements); see, e.g., Noble Corp., No. 10-CV-4336, 11 18, 23, 27.
49. Any request from a customs broker or other third party intermediary for reimbursement of a "facilitat-
ing payment" to a foreign customs official should be subject to special scrutiny. As explained in Section
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B. UNDER-INVOICING SCHEMES
In circumstances in which a customer, other than a U.S. company or its foreign subsidi-
ary, is the importer of record for merchandise to be imported into a country with high
customs duties and import taxes, the U.S. supplier may receive a request from the foreign
customer to state on the commercial invoice accompanying the merchandise a declared
value for that merchandise substantially lower than the actual price of sale of the merchan-
dise. Invariably, the objective of such an "under-invoicing" request is to understate the
declared value of the merchandise for local customs purposes, thereby avoiding lawful
customs duties and import taxes on the importation of that merchandise.50
The issuance of a knowingly false commercial invoice in response to a customer request
may constitute a violation of the books and records section of the FCPA's accounting
provisions. Importantly, as explained in Section H(B) of this paper, supra, the issuance of
such a false commercial invoice may violate those FCPA accounting provisions even
though (i) there is no evidence whatsoever that any improper payment was made by the
issuer or the foreign customer to a foreign customs official in connection with the impor-
tation of the merchandise in question, (ii) the amount of the understatement of the value
of the merchandise on the issuer's commercial invoice is immaterial, and (iii) the issuer
declares the correct value of the merchandise in the "electronic export information" filed
with the U.S. Census Bureau at the time of exportation of the merchandise from the
United States.51
International trade professionals should be aware of the fact that acceding to customer
under-invoicing requests in connection with the importation of merchandise into a for-
eign country may also expose the U.S. supplier to potential criminal liability under other
federal criminal statutes, most notably the federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes. 52
Thus, in Pasquantino v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the convictions of
two defendants for violation of the federal wire fraud statute in connection with a scheme
2(a)(4) of this paper, the fact that a payment to a foreign official is described by the customs broker or other
third party intermediary as a "facilitating payment," does not necessarily make it a lawful payment under the
facilitating payment exception to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. There may be a temptation to
characterize any payment to a foreign customs official as a "facilitating payment" because it is intended to
"facilitate" the importation of merchandise into the foreign country in question and/or to disguise the actual
purpose for the payment.
50. In most countries of the world, customs duties and various other import taxes (e.g. import value added
taxes, goods and services taxes, or their equivalent) are assessed on an ad valorem basis (i.e., the duties and
taxes payable are a percentage of the "customs value" of the imported merchandise). The "customs value" of
imported merchandise in virtually all countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is
determined in accordance with the valuation principles set forth in the WTO Valuation Code (the Agreement
Implementing Article VII of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade 1994). Under Article 1(1) of the
WTO Valuation Code, the customs value of imported merchandise is, in almost all instances, the total price
actually paid or payable by or on behalf of the buyer for the merchandise when sold for exportation to the
country of importation.
51. The United States Foreign Trade Regulations, 15 C.F.R. Part 30, require that "electronic export infor-
mation" must be filed by or on behalf of the exporter with the Census Bureau through the Automated Export
System (AES) for most exports of goods from the United States. Among the data elements to be included
among the "electronic export information" is the value of the exported merchandise, which is defined in
section 30.6(a)(17)(1) of the Foreign Trade Regulations as the selling price at the United States port of expor-
tation. 15 C.F.R. 30.6(a)(17)(1).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), § 1343 (wire fraud).
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to smuggle alcoholic beverages into Canada so as to avoid Canadian customs duties and
alcohol import taxes.53 The federal wire fraud statute prohibits the use of the instrumen-
talities of interstate or international telecommunications in furtherance of any scheme or
artifice to defraud. 54 The Supreme Court held that a scheme to deprive a foreign govern-
ment of lawful duties and taxes comes within the scope of a "scheme or artifice to defraud"
within the intent of that federal wire fraud statute.55 Thus, based on the precedent of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Pasquantino v. United States case, a U.S. supplier that
issues a false commercial invoice with knowledge that the customer intends to use that
false commercial invoice to avoid (evade) customs duties and import taxes may be subject
to liability under the mail and/or wire fraud statutes if there has been any use of the mails
or the instrumentalities of interstate or international telecommunications (telephone calls,
e-mails, etc.) in connection with the under-invoicing request.56
Alternatively, the U.S. supplier may be asked by its foreign customer to overstate the
value of the merchandise on the supplier's commercial invoice, especially where the mer-
chandise in question is duty-free, upon importation into the customer's country. Such
over-invoicing arrangements are typically proposed in furtherance of tax evasion schemes
(e.g., by overstating the cost of goods sold, thereby allowing the customer to declare lower
taxable income for local income tax purposes). Although such over-invoicing schemes
typically do not involve avoidance of customs duties and import taxes, those over-invoic-
ing schemes are subject to the same legal considerations as are under-invoicing schemes,
from the U.S. supplier's perspective. Thus, by issuing an overstated commercial invoice,
the U.S. issuer is making a false accounting record in violation of the FCPA's books and
records requirements. If the U.S. supplier knows that the customer has requested the
overstated invoice in furtherance of a tax evasion scheme, that U.S. supplier may also face
potential criminal liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes.57
C. AVOIDANCE OF IMPORT REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS
In an effort to restrict imports, a number of countries have adopted complex import
regulatory programs. Such import regulatory programs may include (i) import licensing
requirements, (ii) product certification and detailed technical data filing requirements, and
(iii) product testing and inspection requirements. In many instances, the import regula-
tory regimes are less than transparent, such that understanding the compliance obligations
is problematic. In other instances, especially those circumstances in which products are
subject to testing, inspection, and/or detailed technical data filing requirements, compli-
ance may pose a practical risk of loss or theft of trade secrets and confidential technical
information related to the products. In all such cases, the process of obtaining required
import licenses and product certifications and of complying with other non-tariff regula-
tory requirements is likely to be time-consuming and costly. Under the circumstances,
there may be a significant temptation to avoid or otherwise overcome such import regula-
tory requirements and restrictions. A payment made to foreign customs or other import
53. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
55. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 352-53.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see also Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 349-53.
57. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; see also Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 349-53.
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regulatory officials for the purpose of avoiding compliance with import regulatory re-
quirements or restrictions will, however, constitute an unlawful bribe under the anti-brib-
ery provisions of the FCPA.ss Correspondingly, characterization of such a payment as a
"facilitating payment" or otherwise mischaracterizing that payment on the accounting
books and records of an issuer will constitute a violation of the accounting provisions of
the FCPA.S9
The FCPA compliance issues presented by payments made to foreign customs and im-
port officials in order to overcome import regulatory requirements and restrictions are
highlighted by the facts of certain conduct described in the Plea Agreement in United
States v. Panalpina. In that case, certain of Panalpina's customers had imported offshore
drilling rigs into Nigeria on a duty-free basis under a temporary import permit proce-
dure. 60 Under that procedure, upon expiration of the temporary import permit, the off-
shore drilling rig had to be exported from Nigeria, and if use of the drilling rig in
Nigerian waters was still required, that equipment would then have to be reimported
under a new temporary import permit.61 The failure to export the drilling rig upon expi-
ration of its temporary import permit was subject to a fine of up to six times the value of
that drilling rig.62
In order to assist its customers in avoiding the costs and business disruption associated
with the exportation and reimportation of those offshore drilling rigs, Panalpina made
payments to Nigerian customs officials to adopt a "paper process" for the issuance of new
temporary import permits, falsely reflecting the export and reimportation of the drilling
rigs, when no such activities with respect to the drilling rigs had occurred. 63 Those pay-
ments to the Nigerian customs officials were treated as unlawful bribes under the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA in the Panalpina plea agreement.64
The FCPA anti-bribery compliance issue applicable to payments made to foreign cus-
toms officials in connection with the temporary import permit procedure in the Panalpina
case is similarly applicable to payments made to foreign customs officials in order to avoid
other forms of import regulatory requirements or restrictions. For example, in the Hel-
merich & Payne case, certain payments made to Argentine and Venezuelan customs offi-
cials that were held to be unlawful bribes under the FCPA were made in order to import
merchandise that (i) was not in compliance with local product certification requirements,
(ii) had not undergone required product inspections, or (iii) could not be lawfully im-
ported into the country.65
That last set of circumstances (i.e., payments made to customs officials to overcome
statutory or regulatory prohibitions on the importation of certain merchandise) may pose
a special FCPA compliance challenge for international trade professionals working for
U.S. companies in the electronics industry. Many of those electronics companies "re-
cycle" parts and components from defective equipment for use as spare and warranty re-
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
59. See, e.g., Noble Corp., No. 10-CV-4336, 1 23; Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2009 WL 2341649, at 15.





65. See Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2009 WL 2341649, It 6, 11.
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placement parts and components for products sold their customers. Such recycling of
"good" parts and components taken from defective products offers substantial cost savings
in providing customers with warranty service and support and serves important environ-
mental objectives in reducing the amount of electronic waste in the waste stream. None-
theless, the import laws and regulations of a number of major countries prohibit or restrict
the importation of "used" or "refurbished" electronic equipment.66 If the importation of
recycled parts and components into one of those countries is challenged by a local customs
official, there may be a temptation to find ways to overcome that import prohibition,
particularly if the parts and components are required to meet a local customer's urgent
need for product service (e.g., a "machine down" situation). A payment made to a customs
officer to waive or overlook a regulatory restriction on the import of such "used" elec-
tronic equipment will constitute an unlawful bribe under the FCPA.67
D. OFFSHORE PAYMENTs TO THIRD PARTY INTERMEDIARIES
In dealing with third party intermediaries, including customs brokers, import/export
agents, and trade consultants, U.S. companies frequently encounter requests that fees pay-
able for bona fide services performed by those third party intermediaries in connection
with import/export operations be paid to an offshore bank account or to an affiliated com-
pany (frequently located in a tax haven country). Such an offshore payment, by itself,
would not constitute a violation of either the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions or the
FCPA's accounting provisions. Nonetheless, a request by a third party intermediary that a
66. For example, the importation of "used" equipment into Brazil is restricted pursuant to Portaria
DECEX No. 08/91, de 13 de Maio de 1991 (Braz.), as amended by Portario MDIC No. 235/06, de 7 de
dezembro de 2006 and Portaria SECEX No. 23/11 de 14 de julho de 2011 (Braz.). The importation of
"used" items into China is restricted under (1) Order of the General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine Concerning the Issuing of the Administrative Measures for Inspection and Super-
vision of the Old Imported Mechanical and Electrical Products (promulgated by the State Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), May 1, 2003) (China); (2) the Provisions on In-
spection and Supervision Procedures for Import of Old Mechanical and Electrical Products (promulgated by
the State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), October 1, 2008); and
(3) the Measures for Administration of Import of Specified Old Mechanical and Electronic Products (promul-
gated by the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), May 1, 2008).
67. One of the ways in which FCPA compliance issues can arise, effectively inadvertently, from the import
or attempted import of used equipment into one of the countries that restricts or prohibits such imports may
be illustrated by a situation with which the author is familiar. In that situation, a U.S. company shipped
surplus office equipment to its Brazilian subsidiary for the purpose of outfitting a newly established sales
office in that country. The equipment was not described as "used" on the U.S. company's'commercial in-
voice or shipping documentation. The equipment was, however, identified as used by a Brazilian customs
official, who threatened the Brazilian subsidiary and its management with criminal prosecution for (i) at-
tempting to import prohibited products into Brazil and (ii) making a false customs declaration (failing to
describe the equipment as used). The customs officer subsequently indicated to the Brazilian subsidiary's
local attorney that the "problem could go away" if he was paid a substantial sum of money. The Brazilian
attorney suggested to the U.S. company that he would pay the requested amount to the customs officer and
then would invoice that amount to the U.S. company or the Brazilian subsidiary as "legal fees". In view of the
problems presented under both the anti-bribery provisions and the accounting provisions of the FCPA, the
U.S. company refused to make or authorize the payment to the Brazilian customs official and immediately
terminated its relationship with the Brazilian attorney. The Brazilian subsidiary incurred a very substantial
fine for the attempt to import prohibited products, and those products were seized and forfeited by Brazilian
customs.
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U.S. company make payments to an offshore account raises a number of very serious
FCPA compliance challenges.
Proposals for payments for services performed in one country be made to an account or
an entity in another country are typically made in furtherance of schemes to avoid local
currency control requirements and/or local income tax obligations. Thus, receipts that
never appear on the third party intermediaries' books may not be converted into local
currency under applicable currency control regulations and may not be reported as taxable
income on the third party intermediary's local income tax returns. The fact that the third
party intermediary is apparently willing to engage in actions contrary to local currency
control and tax laws may suggest that the person or entity has a cavalier attitude toward
compliance with other legal obligations (including anti-corruption laws such as the
FCPA). Moreover, a request for payments to an offshore account may be made in further-
ance of scheme to establish an "off books" account from which improper payments to
foreign officials may be made with minimal risk of detection. 68 Under the circumstances,
any such request for offshore payments of service fees payable for customs brokerage ser-
vices or other import/export services performed by third party intermediaries should be
seen as a "red flag," suggesting a heightened risk that the third party intermediary may
make improper payments to local customs or import officials in furtherance of import/
export operations on behalf of the U.S. company for which it is performing services.69 If a
U.S. company were to make a payment, even a bona fide service fee payment, to a third
party intermediary with reason to believe that that third party intermediary is trying to
evade income taxes on that service fee, and thereafter the DOJ or SEC were to learn that
the third party also made improper payments to foreign officials, it would be extremely
difficult for the U.S. company to maintain successfully that it had no reason to suspect
that such improper payments might be made by that third party intermediary.
Requests for offshore payments of service fees to third party intermediaries may also
present significant compliance issues under the books and records section of the FCPA's
accounting provisions. If those payments are mischaracterized on the books and records
of account of a U.S. issuer, a violation of the FCPA books and records section will have
occurred. Moreover, even if the nature of the service fees payments are properly de-
scribed on the issuer's books of account, potential violations of both the books and records
section and the internal accounting controls section of the FCPA's accounting provisions
may have occurred if the service fees, while owed to the third party intermediary in one
country, are actually paid to another (affiliated) company in another country.
Finally, consistent with the discussion set forth in Section 11(A) of this paper, supra, if
the U.S. company knows that the request for payments to an offshore account are made in
furtherance of a scheme by the third party intermediary to avoid or evade income taxes
lawfully payable by that third party intermediary in its home country, the U.S. company
may be exposed to criminal liability under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes on the
basis of the legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in its decision in the Pas-
quantino v. United States case. 70
68. See, e.g., United States v. BAE Systems plc, 10-CR-035-JDB, 1 23-31 (D.D.C. 2010).
69. See Tarun, supra note 2, at pp. 91-92 (identifying requests by third party intermediaries for payments to
offshore accounts, and payments to entities located in tax haven countries as "red flags" under the FCPA).
70. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
SUMMER 2013
60 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Under the circumstances, it is recommended that any request by a customs broker,
import/export agent, trade consultant, or other third party intermediary for payment of
service fees to an offshore account should be summarily rejected. Instead, international
trade professionals for U.S. issuers and domestic concerns should insist that all payments
of service fees to third party intermediaries that perform services in connection with im-
port/export operations must be made through normal banking channels (e.g., wire trans-
fers, etc.) to the third party intermediary's bank account in the country in which that third
party intermediary performs the services for that U.S. company.71
E. HosPrrALrry AND Girrs FOR FOREIGN CUSTOMs OFFIcIALs
Significant and difficult FCPA compliance issues may arise with respect to the furnish-
ing of hospitality or gifts to foreign officials, including customs and import regulatory
officials.72 On one hand, a small gift may simply be a token of respect or friendship, as a
normal professional courtesy consistent with local customs and practices. There is, how-
ever, no "de minimis" exception to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, and in 1988,
Congress considered but rejected creating an affirmative defense to those anti-bribery
provisions for nominal payments and gifts to foreign officials given as a courtesy or token
of respect.' 3 Accordingly, the furnishing of hospitality or gifts to foreign officials, includ-
ing customs officials, may constitute a violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA
if given for an improper purpose (i.e., to obtain or retain business or to secure some other
improper purpose).74
A gift given to a foreign customs official, even if relatively modest in value may, there-
fore, constitute a bribe under the FCPA if the U.S. company's intent in providing that gift
is to secure some improper advantage, such as preferential customs treatment; avoidance
of customs duties, import taxes, or import regulatory restrictions; or resolution of prior
non-compliance with customs and import requirements. Intent to secure an improper
advantage may be evidenced by (i) the actual results (e.g., was merchandise imported into a
particular country in a manner contrary to applicable customs laws and regulations?), (ii)
the value of the gift given, (iii) the circumstances in which the gift is given (in the open or
"behind closed doors"), and (iv) how the gift is recorded on the books and records of the
71. Although not directly related to FCPA compliance issues, such offshore payments, especially where
implemented to avoid local currency controls, may pose a risk of significant disruption of important business
operations. The author is familiar with one instance in which a number of leading U.S. companies relied
upon a particular Chinese logistics service provider to handle the importation, warehousing, and supply of
warranty and replacement parts for Chinese customers. The logistics service provider had requested that all
fees payable by the U.S. companies for those services be made to an account maintained by an affiliate of the
logistics service provider in Hong Kong. When the Chinese authorities learned that the logistics service
provider was receiving fees in Hong Kong for services performed in China, in violation of Chinese currency
control regulations, those authorities shut down the operations of the logistics service provider in a "dawn
raid." One of the effects of that shut down was that the U.S. companies were unable to fulfill their warranty
and service obligations to their Chinese customers for several months, until alternate logistics service provid-
ers could be identified and supported.
72. For a general discussion of the FCPA compliance issues arising in connection with the furnishing of
hospitality and gifts to foreign officials, see DOJISEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 15-19.
73. See H.R. CONFERENCE REr. No. 100-576, at 922.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
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U.S. company. FCPA compliance risks associated with the giving of gifts to foreign offi-
cials may, therefore, be mitigated by:
* strict corporate guidelines for such gift giving, with dollar limits on the value of any
gift and clear approval procedures for any such gift;
* documented justification for any proposed gift as a condition of approval;
* transparency in the giving and receiving of such gifts;
* confirmation that the giving and receiving of the gift is lawful under the laws of the
foreign official's home country; and
* proper recording of the gift on the books and record of the U.S. company, in con-
formance with the FCPA's accounting provisions. 75
Questions frequently arise regarding the FCPA compliance implications of furnishing
gifts to a foreign government agency. As the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit
improper payments and gifts to foreign officials, a bona fide gift to a foreign government
agency or department should not, in most instances, constitute an improper payment
under those anti-bribery provisions.76
Nonetheless, FCPA compliance issues can arise in the context of the furnishing of a gift
to a local customs office. For example, it may be proposed (typically by local managers)
that a Chinese subsidiary of a U.S. corporation give boxes of "moon cakes" on the occa-
sion of the celebration of Chinese New Year to the local customs office where the subsidi-
ary's imports are processed. Although the "moon cakes" would be delivered to the local
customs office, rather than given to a particular customs official, if the intent of the gift is
to furnish an incentive to local customs officials to provide or to furnish a reward to those
local customs officials for providing preferential customs treatment contrary to applicable
Chinese customs and import laws and regulations, the gift of those "moon cakes" ostensi-
bly to the local customs office may, in fact, be characterized as an improper payment
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.
F. FCPA COMPLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE EXPORT OF DEFENSE ARTICLES
The Plea Agreement in the United States v. BAE Systems case illustrates the intersection
between the FCPA and export compliance requirements with respect to the export of
defense articles under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).77 Under the
Arms Export Control Act and ITAR, an export license from the State Department's Di-
rectorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) is required for the export of "defense arti-
cles" or "defense services" to any foreign country.7 8 Under section 130.9 of ITAR, in any
application for such an export license, the applicant must disclose to the DDTC whether
it has paid (i) any political contributions of $5,000 or more or (ii) any fees or commissions
75. See, DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 16.
76. See, e.g., Opinion Procedure Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 06-01 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at www.jus
tice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2006/0601.pdf. In that opinion, the Department of Justice approved a
proposal by a U.S. company to contribute $25,000 to the Customs department in an African country as part
of a pilot project to enhance anti-counterfeiting enforcement by local customs officers.
77. United States v. BAE Systems plc, 10-CR-035-JDB (D.D.C. 2010). As part of that plea agreement,
BAE Systems paid criminal fines of $400 million for a series of violations of the anti-bribery and books and
record provisions of the FCPA, violations of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2, and
violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2012).
78. See 22 C.F.R. § 123.1 (2012).
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of $100,000 or more in connection with the proposed sale of defense articles or defense
services for which the export license is sought.79
Among the charges against BAE Systems that resulted in the March 1, 2010, plea agree-
ment were violations of that section 130.9 of ITAR.so According to the plea agreement,
BAE Systems failed to disclose to DDTC, on its export license applications, the commis-
sions paid to so-called "market advisors" who had been retained by BAE Systems to assist
in securing sales of defense articles.8' The rationale for failing to disclose the commis-
sions paid to those "market advisors," as stated in the plea agreement, was to conceal the
relationships between BAE Systems and the "market advisors," especially because BAE
Systems was aware that there was a high probability that the "market advisors" would pay
a portion of their commissions to foreign officials to secure favorable decisions in the
purchase of defense services. 82
For those international trade professionals working for U.S. companies that are en-
gaged in the export of defense articles and defense services, it is, therefore, imperative that
they have a very clear understanding of their companies' relationships with all third party
intermediaries; including sales representatives, commission agents, sales consultants, and
"market advisors." It is only with that clear understanding that the international trade
professionals can assure compliance with the commission reporting requirements of sec-
tion 130.9 of ITAR. In addition, through that understanding, the international trade pro-
fessionals can perform an important role in FCPA compliance (i.e., in preventing market
advisor arrangements of the kind at issue in the United States v. BAE Systems case).83
G. MERGER AND AcQuisrIoN TRANSACTIONS
Corporate merger and acquisition transactions raise special FCPA compliance chal-
lenges for acquirers that are issuers or domestic concerns. If, at the time of the acquisi-
tion, the acquirer fails to identify and take remedial action with respect to prior non-
compliance by the target company, there is a substantial risk of successor liability on the
part of the acquirer under the FCPA. In addition, if ongoing compliance problems on the
part of the target company under either the anti-bribery provisions or the accounting
provisions (or both) of the FCPA remain undetected and persist following the completion
of the acquisition transaction, the acquirer is exposed to the risk of direct liability under
the FCPA for post-acquisition non-compliance. For that reason, FCPA practitioners rec-
ommend, and the DOJ and SEC encourage, U.S. companies to include a robust FCPA
79. 22 C.F.R. § 130.9.
80. See BAE Systems pk, 10-CR-035, 1 19.
81. See Id. 1 26-32.
82. See BAE Systems plc, 10-CR-035, $91 21-29. The steps BAE Systems took to conceal its commission
payments to those "market advisors" were also deemed to be a violation of the FCPA's accounting provisions.
83. U.S. companies engaged in the export of defense articles and defense services should be aware that a
criminal conviction for violation of the FCPA is grounds for statutory debarment under the ITAR. Section
127.7(c) of the ITAR prohibits the DDTC from issuing any export license or other authorization for the
export of defense articles or defense service for a period of three years to any person or entity that has been
convicted of violating any one of the United States criminal statutes enumerated in section 120.27 of the
ITAR. Section 120.27(a)(6) of the ITAR lists among those criminal statutes the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA
VOL. 47, NO. 1
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 63
compliance element in their pre-acquisition due diligence review of prospective acquisi-
tion targets. 84
Based on the foregoing, many U.S. companies and their outside legal and accounting
advisors have incorporated FCPA compliance into their pre-acquisition due diligence re-
views. Similarly, many of those U.S. companies, particularly those companies that are
major importers of merchandise into the United States and/or deal regularly in commodi-
ties and technologies that are restricted for export control purposes, have an international
trade compliance element in their pre-acquisition due diligence protocols. 85 In most
cases, however, those two elements of the due diligence review are conducted separately,
and corporate international trade compliance professionals are seldom involved in the
analysis and assessment of the FCPA compliance risks presented by a potential acquisition
target.
The failure to engage international trade professionals in the FCPA compliance pre-
acquisition due diligence process is unfortunate and poses a significant risk that improper
payments to foreign officials in connection with the target company's import/export oper-
ations will be missed in that due diligence process. Through the trade compliance due
diligence process, corporate international trade professionals may be best positioned to
identify "red flags" suggesting the possibility of such improper payments and/or account-
ing irregularities of the kind discussed in the paper in connection with the target's import/
export operations. To that end, however, those corporate international trade professionals
must (i) have a clear understanding of the application and scope of the FCPA and (ii) be
integral members of the FCPA compliance pre-acquisition due diligence team.
IV. Conclusion
As discussed in this paper, import/export operations, especially in high-risk corruption
countries, pose significant FCPA compliance risks. Those FCPA compliance risks are in-
herent in such import/export operations, especially because (i) by their very nature, they
involve direct and substantial interactions with foreign officials in transactions in which
substantial sums of money may be involved (both in terms of the value of the merchandise
and the amounts of customs duties and taxes potentially payable) and (ii) of the need to
rely upon third party intermediaries, such as customs brokers and import/export agents,
for the performance of key elements of such import/export operations. An effective FCPA
compliance program for any issuer or domestic concern that is involved in import/export
operations (including merely supplying products to customers located abroad) should in-
clude the full engagement of the company's international trade professionals. To that end,
corporate international trade professionals require a clear understanding of the require-
ments, restrictions, and scope of application of both the anti-bribery and accounting pro-
84. See DOJ/SEC FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28-33. For a template of an FCPA compli-
ance pre-acquisition due diligence checklist, see Tarun, supra note 2, at 110-11.
85. See generally, United States v. Shields Rubber Corp., 732 F.Supp. 569 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (successor liabil-
ity for customs violations); Sigma-Aldrich Corp., Case No. 01-BXA-06, AIJ Decision (August 29, 2002)
(successor liability for export control violations), available at www.bis.doc.gov/enforcement/casesummaries/
sigma-aldrich alj decision 02.htm.
SUMMER 2013
64 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
visions of the FCPA, and corporate ethics and compliance officers must have an
appreciation of the nature and scope of FCPA compliance risks arising out of import/
export operations. It is hoped that this paper will make a contribution to those processes.
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